SPANlogo-250

"Of all the forms of inequality,
injustice in health care is the most shocking and inhumane."

–Martin Luther King, Jr.

youtube 30     twitter 30   facebook 30  

News

SPAN State Council

The following individuals were elected by their respective constituencies to serve on the SPAN State Council for a one-year term ending in April, 2017:

Executive Committee
Deborah Silverstein — SPAN Ohio State Director
Vann Seawell — SPAN Ohio Secretary
Barbara Walden — SPAN Ohio Treasurer
Brad Cotton, M.D. — At Large
Bob Krasen — At Large
Sean Nestor — At Large
Johnathon Ross, M.D. — At Large
Marcia Hartman — At Large
 
Regional Coordinators
Region 1 — Ted Seuss
Region 2 — Dennis Slotnick
Region 3 — Patty Mercer
Region 4 — Dee Chavez
Region 5 — Marilyn Webster, R.N.
Region 6 — John Gordon
Region 7 — Matt Noordsij-Jones, M.D.
 
Labor
Bob Fry
Dave Pavlick, Sr.
Melvin Scott
  
Health Care Community
Richard Bozian, M.D.
Dee Chavez
Alice Faryna, M.D.
Alexandra Kendzierski
Katherine Lambes, M.D.
Joan Matyskella
Matt Noordsij-Jones, M.D.
Don Rucknagel, M.D., Ph.D.
Kelsey Starr
 
Community Organizations
Connie Hammond
Diana King
Logan Martinez
Kendall Mays
 
Faith Groups
Bill Davis
Dennis Lambert
Dorsey Stebbins
April Stoltz
 
Other Organizations / Individuals
Robin Deters
Marcia Hartman
Bob Parker
 
Business Community
Freeda Flynn, M.D.
Robert Kemp

Links

Wiki Page for 2015 SPAN Annual Conference

Healthcare Is a Human Right
Healthcare-NOW! A national grassroots advocacy organization in support of single-payer health care with a network of activists in 42 states.
Illinois Single-Payer Coalition
Kaiser Family Foundation: State Health Facts
Kentuckians for Single-Payer Health Care
Labor Campaign for Single Payer Healthcare
Maryland Chapter PNHP is a chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program, a nonprofit research and education organization of 16,000 physicians, medical students, and health professionals who support single-payer national health insurance.
Maryland Citizens Health Initiative
Massachusetts Campaign for Single Payer Health Care (MASS-CARE)
MEDICARE for ALL
Minnesota Citizens Organized Acting Together (COACT)
National Nurses United
Our Ailing Health Care
Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP)
Physicians Working Group Proposal for Single-Payer National Health Insurance
Public Citizen
Single-Minded for Single-Payer: An Interview with Kevin Grumbach
Single-Payer: Answers and Facts About Health Care for All
Single-Payer Action A nonprofit activist-fueled organization based in Washington, D.C.
Single Payer Central
Single Payer New York
Single Payer NOW
Tennessee Health Care Campaign (THCC)
Unions for Single Payer Health Care
United for National Health Care
Universal Health Care Action Network (UHCAN-National Office)
Universal Health Care Action Network Ohio (UHCAN-Ohio Office)
Vermont Health Care for All
Working America - Community Affiliate of the AFL-CIO

About Us

WHO WE ARE – The Single-Payer Action Network Ohio (SPAN Ohio) is a statewide coalition of organizations and individuals in Ohio seeking fundamental health care reform in our state and country so that every resident is guaranteed full and comprehensive coverage. This includes the full range of medical services, hospitalization, prescriptions, vision care, dental care, mental health care, home care, long-term care, and care for all injuries and illnesses. 

We advocate the establishment of a public fund that would pay all health care bills without co-payments or deductibles. Funding would come from the savings realized by eliminating the administrative waste and profits of the 1,500 private insurance companies and HMOs, savings from greater utilization of preventive medicine, and from additional mechanisms deemed necessary to ensure that the public fund has the necessary financial resources, with adequate reserves. The plan we call for is known as a single-payer health care system.

SPAN Ohio is a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)4 organization.

Contributions to SPAN are not tax deductible.

WHAT WE DO – We carry out a variety of programs designed to educate and inform on the need for single-payer. A focus of our activities is to win enactment of the Ohio Health Care Plan, either through direct legislative action or by an initiative petition sponsored by SPAN Ohio.

SPAN Ohio functions democratically and those who attend its meetings decide what the group's activities shall be. We distribute educational materials, organize public meetings featuring physicians and others with expertise on health care issues, circulate petitions, and introduce single-payer resolutions to organizations and legislative bodies. While campaigning to win single-payer health care in Ohio, we see this as a stepping stone toward achieving a national single-payer health care system, which is our ultimate goal.

HOW TO REACH US — Voice mail: 216-736-4766 — Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. — Web site: www.spanohio.org

WHEN WE MEET – SPAN Ohio meets quarterly. Check the SPAN Ohio website calendar for dates, times and locations. Join us!

Origins and Development of SPAN Ohio

When the Clinton health care plan collapsed in 1994, many people active in the movement to reform the system concluded that national health care was way off in the remote future and that the emphasis should be on attempting to win "small victories" and incremental reforms.

Actually, the Clinton plan never called for true universal health care. It specifically rejected eliminating the private health care insurance companies from the system. It was basically a plan for managed care or, more accurately, managed costs.

A broad coalition of forces actively fighting for a single-payer system in the early 1990s disappeared after the 1994 debacle. By the year 2000, increasing numbers of people had come to understand that an incremental approach could not solve the country's health care crisis and that only a fundamental reform of the system would. Indeed, when Clinton left office, there were eight million more people without health care insurance than on the day he was inaugurated. The single-payer movement began to experience a revival.

In February, 2001, six people met at a union office in Cleveland and constituted themselves the Single-Payer Universal Health Care Organizing Committee (SPUHCOC). Their goal was to educate the public about the advantages of a single-payer plan and to build a movement at the grass roots calling upon the Ohio General Assembly to establish such a system.

The founding group was diverse in composition and included unionists, a physician, community activists and retirees. SPUHCOC decided as its initial function to organize a public meeting to be addressed by Claudia Fegan, a Chicago physician who was a past president of Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP) and co-author of Universal Health Care: What the United States Can Learn From the Canadian Experience. The meeting was held April 10 and drew an audience of 130 at Case Western Reserve University.

In subsequent months, SPUHCOC concentrated on drafting a model single-payer resolution and getting political bodies, other health care groups, health care providers, unions, community organizations and faith groups to endorse it. In relatively short order, the Cleveland City Council approved the model resolution with only minor modifications and other cities and town councils followed suit. Many physicians, nurses, local unions, and a variety of others endorsed a statement which simply said, "We endorse the campaign to get the Ohio General Assembly to act without delay to pass publicly funded health care guaranteeing coverage for all Ohioans." This statement was unanimously approved by the Cuyahoga County Commissioners, three members of Congress — Sherrod Brown, Dennis Kucinich and Stephanie Tubbs-Jones — and a number of state legislators.

In November, 2001, at the insistence of growing numbers of activists, SPUHCOC changed its name to Single-Payer Action Network Ohio (SPAN Ohio). Meanwhile, single-payer groups in Toledo and Cincinnati had begun to form and they affiliated with SPAN.

In early 2002, thousands of steelworker retirees from LTV in the Greater Cleveland area lost health care benefits they thought had been guaranteed for life. They were among 600,000 steel retirees confronted with the same drastic loss. The anguish of this situation and the constantly growing numbers of the uninsured from all walks of life created further disillusionment with the market-driven, for-profit system and much greater openness to the single-payer alternative.

By mid-2002, SPAN had become the established organizing center for the single-payer movement in Ohio. By then, SPAN had established a web site at www.spanohio.org, which in its first six months received over 10,000 hits.

It became clear that SPAN needed to branch out and become a genuine statewide coalition. In the summer of 2002, SPAN activists began discussing the possibility of organizing a statewide conference which could be the springboard for forming an Ohio coalition that could mount an effective campaign for single-payer. In September, 2002, the Ohio AFL-CIO, representing 850,000 workers and meeting in convention in Cleveland, voted unanimously to endorse SPAN's campaign for a single-payer health care system in Ohio. The UAW, on a statewide basis, had also endorsed. These developments helped propel momentum for the state conference, which was held in Columbus on January 18, 2003.

This conference was a great success with keynote speeches by Dr. Claudia Fegan and Dan Martin, representing Steelworkers District 1, a panel discussion and workshops for constituency groups. The upshot of the conference was a call for a March 1 meeting to formally launch a statewide single-payer coalition.

The March 1 meeting brought together organizations representing a million Ohioans and a number of dedicated individuals. It was agreed that "Single-Payer Action Network Ohio (SPAN Ohio)" would be the name of the coalition formed at the meeting. An Interim Steering Committee of 29 was elected, pending the adoption of bylaws.

While SPAN continued to gather endorsements for its campaign, the March 1 meeting exhibited increasing interest in the idea of an initiative petition ballot campaign to put the single-payer issue on the ballot. Bob Smiddie, of Pomeroy, had long been urging an initiative and, now that SPAN Ohio had the affiliation of major forces, the idea seemed eminently reasonable, despite Ohio's highly restrictive constitutional provisions on initiatives.

In the months following that meeting, SPAN fleshed out its structure, approved bylaws, changed the name of its governing body to State Council (retaining as members on that body those previously elected to the Interim Steering Committee while adding others), convened periodic meetings of the State Council and moved forward in the drafting of the initiative petition. After months of meetings, discussions and plain hard work, a petition upon which all could agree was finalized and approved by a statewide meeting of SPAN supporters. The petition summary and 201 signatures were filed with the Attorney General's office on July 14, 2004. (The state requires that 100 or more qualified electors sign to begin the process of proposing a law to the Legislature.) On August 5, 2004, the Attorney General certified the petition, and by August 20, five thousand copies, each accommodating 65 signatures, had been printed for distribution. Within five days, nearly 2500 had been picked up by chapters, unions, and individual supporters, all volunteering to help SPAN reach its goal of 140,000 valid signatures. (To be valid, a signature must be that of a registered voter, and must be personally witnessed by the petition circulator.)

SPAN State Council meetings are often characterized by robust debate, reflecting the internal democracy and diversity of views within the coalition. Throughout, it has maintained unity and continues to attract more and more organizations and individuals fed up with the current system and wanting a new one guaranteeing quality and comprehensive health care coverage for all Ohioans. If you are interested in recruiting SPAN supporters in your area, please call 216-736-4766 or email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

 

 

Healthcare is a Human Right

Health Care is a HUMAN RIGHT

"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate to the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services....." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, signed and ratified by the United States of America.

The right to health is universally recognized as fundamental to human dignity, freedom and well-being. There are many factors that influence our state of health and well-being including housing, workplace safety, environmental conditions, access to a safe and sustainable food supply and our own genetics. However, access to comprehensive medical care is fundamental to our health and well-being. Without that, it is impossible for a person to realize their full potential and dignity as a human being

In order to meet human rights standards, a health care system must be:

  • Universal,
  • Accessible to all and available to all,
  • High quality standards of care for all,
  • Comprehensive and appropriate to all health needs,
  • Financed and delivered in a non-discriminatory way that enables the participation of all individuals and communities,
  • Provides access to information,
  • Ensures transparency and
  • Has effective mechanisms to hold both the public and private sector accountable to the citizens.

SPAN Ohio is dedicated to achieving a health care system that fulfills the human right to health care and that ensures every person will receive the care they need in a manner that affords them the dignity they deserve.

For further information on the human right to health care, read the following articles:

 

 

THE RISK POOL

What’s behind Ireland’s economic miracle—and G.M.’s financial crisis?

by MALCOLM GLADWELL

Issue of 2006-08-28

 

The years just after the Second World War were a time of great industrial upheaval in the United States. Strikes were commonplace. Workers moved from one company to another. Runaway inflation was eroding the value of wages. In the uncertain nineteen-forties, in the wake of the Depression and the war, workers wanted security, and in 1949 the head of the Toledo, Ohio, local of the United Auto Workers, Richard Gosser, came up with a proposal. The workers of Toledo needed pensions. But, he said, the pension plan should be regional, spread across the many small auto-parts makers, electrical-appliance manufacturers, and plastics shops in the Toledo area. That way, if workers switched jobs they could take their pension credits with them, and if a company went bankrupt its workers’ retirement would be safe. Every company in the area, Gosser proposed, should pay ten cents an hour, per worker, into a centralized fund.

 

The business owners of Toledo reacted immediately. “They were terrified,” says Jennifer Klein, a labor historian at Yale University, who has written about the Toledo case. “They organized a trade association to stop the plan. In the business press, they actually said, ‘This idea might be efficient and rational. But it’s too dangerous.’ Some of the larger employers stepped forward and said, ‘We’ll offer you a company pension. Forget about that whole other idea.’ They took on the costs of setting up an individual company pension, at great expense, in order to head off what they saw as too much organized power for workers in the region.”

 

A year later, the same issue came up in Detroit. The president of General Motors at the time was Charles E. Wilson, known as Engine Charlie. Wilson was one of the highest-paid corporate executives in America, earning $586,100 (and paying, incidentally, $430,350 in taxes). He was in contract talks with Walter Reuther, the national president of the U.A.W. The two men had already agreed on a cost-of-living allowance. Now Wilson went one step further, and, for the first time, offered every G.M. employee health-care benefits and a pension.

 

Reuther had his doubts. He lived in a northwest Detroit bungalow, and drove a 1940 Chevrolet. His salary was ten thousand dollars a year. He was the son of a Debsian Socialist, worked for the Socialist Party during his college days, and went to the Soviet Union in the nineteen-thirties to teach peasants how to be auto machinists. His inclination was to fight for changes that benefitted every worker, not just those lucky enough to be employed by General Motors. In the nineteen-thirties, unions had launched a number of health-care plans, many of which cut across individual company and industry lines. In the nineteen-forties, they argued for expanding Social Security. In 1945, when President Truman first proposed national health insurance, they cheered. In 1947, when Ford offered its workers a pension, the union voted it down. The labor movement believed that the safest and most efficient way to provide insurance against ill health or old age was to spread the costs and risks of benefits over the biggest and most diverse group possible. Walter Reuther, as Nelson Lichtenstein argues in his definitive biography, believed that risk ought to be broadly collectivized. Charlie Wilson, on the other hand, felt the way the business leaders of Toledo did: that collectivization was a threat to the free market and to the autonomy of business owners. In his view, companies themselves ought to assume the risks of providing insurance.

 

America’s private pension system is now in crisis. Over the past few years, American taxpayers have been put at risk of assuming tens of billions of dollars of pension liabilities from once profitable companies. Hundreds of thousands of retired steelworkers and airline employees have seen health-care benefits that were promised to them by their employers vanish. General Motors, the country’s largest automaker, is between forty and fifty billion dollars behind in the money it needs to fulfill its health-care and pension promises. This crisis is sometimes portrayed as the result of corporate America’s excessive generosity in making promises to its workers. But when it comes to retirement, health, disability, and unemployment benefits there is nothing exceptional about the United States: it is average among industrialized countries—more generous than Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Italy, just behind Finland and the United Kingdom, and on a par with the Netherlands and Denmark. The difference is that in most countries the government, or large groups of companies, provides pensions and health insurance. The United States, by contrast, has over the past fifty years followed the lead of Charlie Wilson and the bosses of Toledo and made individual companies responsible for the care of their retirees. It is this fact, as much as any other, that explains the current crisis. In 1950, Charlie Wilson was wrong, and Walter Reuther was right.

 

The key to understanding the pension business is something called the “dependency ratio,” and dependency ratios are best understood in the context of countries. In the past two decades, for instance, Ireland has gone from being one of the most economically backward countries in Western Europe to being one of the strongest: its growth rate has been roughly double that of the rest of Europe. There is no shortage of conventional explanations. Ireland joined the European Union. It opened up its markets. It invested well in education and economic infrastructure. It’s a politically stable country with a sophisticated, mobile workforce.

 

But, as the Harvard economists David Bloom and David Canning suggest in their study of the “Celtic Tiger,” of greater importance may have been a singular demographic fact. In 1979, restrictions on contraception that had been in place since Ireland’s founding were lifted, and the birth rate began to fall. In 1970, the average Irishwoman had 3.9 children. By the mid-nineteen-nineties, that number was less than two. As a result, when the Irish children born in the nineteen-sixties hit the workforce, there weren’t a lot of children in the generation just behind them. Ireland was suddenly free of the enormous social cost of supporting and educating and caring for a large dependent population. It was like a family of four in which, all of a sudden, the elder child is old enough to take care of her little brother and the mother can rejoin the workforce. Overnight, that family doubles its number of breadwinners and becomes much better off.

 

This relation between the number of people who aren’t of working age and the number of people who are is captured in the dependency ratio. In Ireland during the sixties, when contraception was illegal, there were ten people who were too old or too young to work for every fourteen people in a position to earn a paycheck. That meant that the country was spending a large percentage of its resources on caring for the young and the old. Last year, Ireland’s dependency ratio hit an all-time low: for every ten dependents, it had twenty-two people of working age. That change coincides precisely with the country’s extraordinary economic surge.

 

Demographers estimate that declines in dependency ratios are responsible for about a third of the East Asian economic miracle of the postwar era; this is a part of the world that, in the course of twenty-five years, saw its dependency ratio decline thirty-five per cent. Dependency ratios may also help answer the much-debated question of whether India or China has a brighter economic future. Right now, China is in the midst of what Joseph Chamie, the former director of the United Nations’ population division, calls the “sweet spot.” In the nineteen-sixties, China brought down its birth rate dramatically; those children are now grown up and in the workforce, and there is no similarly sized class of dependents behind them. India, on the other hand, reduced its birth rate much more slowly and has yet to hit the sweet spot. Its best years are ahead.

 

The logic of dependency ratios, of course, works equally powerfully in reverse. If your economy benefits by having a big bulge of working-age people, then your economy will have a harder time of it when that bulge generation retires, and there are relatively few workers to take their place. For China, the next few decades will be more difficult. “China will peak with a 1-to-2.6 dependency ratio between 2010 and 2015,” Bloom says. “But then it’s back to a little over 1-to-1.5 by 2050. That’s a pretty dramatic change. Thirty per cent of the Chinese population will be over sixty by 2050. That’s four hundred and thirty-two million people.” Demographers sometimes say that China is in a race to get rich before it gets old.

 

Economists have long paid attention to population growth, making the argument that the number of people in a country is either a good thing (spurring innovation) or a bad thing (depleting scarce resources). But an analysis of dependency ratios tells us that what’s critical is not just the growth of a population but its structure. “The introduction of demographics has reduced the need for the argument that there was something exceptional about East Asia or idiosyncratic to Africa,” Bloom and Canning write, in their study of the Irish economic miracle. “Once age-structure dynamics are introduced into an economic growth model, these regions are much closer to obeying common principles of economic growth.”

 

This is an important point. People have talked endlessly of Africa’s political and social and economic shortcomings and simultaneously of some magical cultural ingredient possessed by South Korea and Japan and Taiwan that has brought them success. But the truth is that sub-Saharan Africa has been mired in a debilitating 1-to-1 ratio for decades, and that proportion of dependency would frustrate and complicate economic development anywhere. Asia, meanwhile, has seen its demographic load lighten overwhelmingly in the past thirty years. Getting to a 1-to-2.5 ratio doesn’t make economic success inevitable. But, given a reasonably functional economic and political infrastructure, it certainly makes it a lot easier.

 

This demographic logic also applies to companies, since any employer that offers pensions and benefits to its employees has to deal with the consequences of itsnonworker-to-worker ratio, just as a country does. An employer that promised, back in the nineteen-fifties, to pay for its employees’ health care when they were retired didn’t set aside the money for that while they were working. It just paid the bills as they came in: money generated by current workers was used to pay for the costs of taking care of past workers. Pensions worked roughly the same way. On the day a company set up a pension plan, it was immediately on the hook for all the years of service accumulated by employees up to that point: the worker who was sixty-four when the pension was started got a pension when he retired at sixty-five, even though he had been in the system only a year. That debt is called a “past service” obligation, and in some cases in the nineteen-forties and fifties the past-service obligations facing employers were huge. At Ford, the amount reportedly came to two hundred million dollars, or just under three thousand dollars per employee. At Bethlehem Steel, it came to four thousand dollars per worker.

 

Companies were required to put aside a little extra money every year to make up for that debt, with the hope of someday—twenty or thirty years down the line—becoming fully funded. In practice, though, that was difficult. Suppose that a company agrees to give its workers a pension of fifty dollars a month for every year of service. Several years later, after a round of contract negotiations, that multiple is raised to sixty dollars a month. That increase applies retroactively: now that company has a brand-new past-service obligation equal to another ten dollars for every month served by its wage employees. Or suppose the stock market goes into decline or interest rates fall, and the company discovers that its pension plan has less money than it had expected. Now it’s behind again: it has to go back to using the money generated by current workers in order to take care of the costs of past workers. “You start off in the hole,” Steven Sass, a pension expert at Boston College, says. “And the problem in these plans is that it’s very difficult to dig your way out.”

 

Charlie Wilson’s promise to his workers, then, contained an audacious assumption about G.M.’s dependency ratio: that the company would always have enough active workers to cover the costs of its retired workers—that it would always be like Ireland, and never like sub-Saharan Africa. Wilson’s promise, in other words, was actually a gamble. Is it any wonder that the prospect of private pensions made people like Walter Reuther so nervous?

 

The most influential management theorist of the twentieth century was Peter Drucker, who, in 1950, wrote an extraordinarily prescient article for Harper’s entitled “The Mirage of Pensions.” It ought to be reprinted for every steelworker, airline mechanic, and autoworker who is worried about his retirement. Drucker simply couldn’t see how the pension plans on the table at companies like G.M. could ever work. “For such a plan to give real security, the financial strength of the company and its economic success must be reasonably secure for the next forty years,” Drucker wrote. “But is there any one company or any one industry whose future can be predicted with certainty for even ten years ahead?” He concluded, “The recent pension plans thus offer no more security against the big bad wolf of old age than the little piggy’s house of straw.”

 

In the mid-nineteen-fifties, the largest steel mill in the world was at Sparrows Point, just east of Baltimore, on the Chesapeake Bay. It was owned by Bethlehem Steel, one of the nation’s grandest industrial enterprises. The steel for the Golden Gate Bridge came from Sparrows Point, as did the cables for the George Washington Bridge, and the materials for countless guns and planes and ships that helped win both world wars. Sparrows Point, a so-called integrated mill, used a method of making steel that dated back to the nineteenth century. Coke and iron, the raw materials, were combined in a blast furnace to make liquid pig iron. The pig iron was poured into a vast oven, known as an open-hearth furnace, to make molten steel. The steel was poured into pots to make ingots. The ingots were cooled, reheated, and fed into a half-mile-long rolling mill and turned into semi-finished shapes, which eventually became girders for the construction industry or wafer-thin sheets for beer cans or galvanized panels for the automobile industry. Open-hearth steelmaking was expensive and time-consuming. It required great amounts of energy, water, and space. Sparrows Point stretched four miles from one end to the other. Most important, it required lots and lots of people. Sparrows Point, at its height, employed tens of thousands of them. As Mark Reutter demonstrates in “Making Steel,” his comprehensive history of Sparrows Point, it was not just a steel mill. It was a city.

 

In 1956, Eugene Grace, the head of Bethlehem Steel, was the country’s best- paid executive. Eleven of the country’s eighteen top-earning executives that year, in fact, worked for Bethlehem Steel. In 1955, when the American Iron and Steel Institute had its annual meeting, at the Waldorf-Astoria, in New York, the No. 2 at Bethlehem Steel, Arthur Homer, made a bold forecast: domestic demand for steel, he said, would increase by fifty per cent over the next fifteen years. “As someone has said, the American people are wanters,” he told the audience of twelve hundred industry executives. “Their wants are going to require a great deal of steel.”

 

But Big Steel didn’t get bigger. It got smaller. Imports began to take a larger and larger share of the American steel market. The growing use of aluminum, concrete, and plastic cut deeply into the demand for steel. And the steelmaking process changed. Instead of laboriously making steel from scratch, with coke and iron ore, factories increasingly just melted down scrap metal. The open-hearth furnace was replaced with the basic oxygen furnace, which could make the same amount of steel in about a tenth of the time. Steelmakers switched to continuous casting, which meant that you skipped the ingot phase altogether and poured your steel products directly out of the furnace. As a result, steelmakers like Bethlehem were no longer hiring young workers to replace the people who retired. They were laying people off by the thousands. But every time they laid off another employee they turned a money-making steelworker into a money-losing retiree—and their dependency ratio got a little worse. According to Reutter, Bethlehem had a hundred and sixty-four thousand workers in 1957. By the mid-to-late-nineteen-eighties, it was down to thirty-five thousand workers, and employment at Sparrows Point had fallen to seventy-nine hundred. In 2001, Bethlehem, just shy of its hundredth birthday, declared bankruptcy. It had twelve thousand active employees and ninety thousand retirees and their spouses drawing benefits. It had reached what might be a record-setting dependency ratio of 7.5 pensioners for every worker.

 

What happened to Bethlehem, of course, is what happened throughout American industry in the postwar period. Technology led to great advances in productivity, so that when the bulge of workers hired in the middle of the century retired and began drawing pensions, there was no one replacing them in the workforce. General Motors today makes more cars and trucks than it did in the early nineteen-sixties, but it does so with about a third of the employees. In 1962, G.M. had four hundred and sixty-four thousand U.S. employees and was paying benefits to forty thousand retirees and their spouses, for a dependency ratio of one pensioner to 11.6 employees. Last year, it had a hundred and forty-one thousand workers and paid benefits to four hundred and fifty-three thousand retirees, for a dependency ratio of 3.2 to 1.

 

Looking at General Motors and the old-line steel companies in demographic terms substantially changes the way we understand their problems. It is a commonplace assumption, for instance, that they were undone by overly generous union contracts. But, when dependency ratios start getting up into the 3-to-1 to 7-to-1 range, the issue is not so much what you are paying each dependent as how many dependents you are paying. “There is this notion that there is a Cadillac being provided to all these retirees,” Ron Bloom, a senior official at the United Steelworkers, says. “It’s not true. The truth is seventy-five-year-old widows living on less than three hundred dollars to four hundred dollars a month. It’s just that there’s a lot of them.”

 

A second common assumption is that fading industrial giants like G.M. and Bethlehem are victims of their own managerial incompetence. In various ways, they undoubtedly are. But, with respect to the staggering burden of benefit obligations, what got them in trouble isn’t what they did wrong; it is what they did right. They got in trouble in the nineteen-nineties because they were around in the nineteen-fifties—and survived to pay for the retirement of the workers they hired forty years ago. They got in trouble because they innovated, and became more efficient in their use of labor.

 

“We are making as much steel as we made thirty years ago with twenty-five per cent of the workforce,” Michael Locker, a steel-industry consultant, says. “And it is a much higher quality of steel, too. There is simply no comparison. That change recasts the industry and it recasts the workforce. You get this enormous bulge. It’s abnormal. It’s not predicted, and it’s not funded. Is that the fault of the steelworkers? Is that the fault of the companies?”

 

Here, surely, is the absurdity of a system in which individual employers are responsible for providing their own employee benefits. It penalizes companies for doing what they ought to do. General Motors, by American standards, has an old workforce: its average worker is much older than, say, the average worker at Google. That has an immediate effect: health-care costs are a linear function of age. The average cost of health insurance for an employee between the ages of thirty-five and thirty-nine is $3,759 a year, and for someone between the ages of sixty and sixty-four it is $7,622. This goes a long way toward explaining why G.M. has an estimated sixty-two billion dollars in health-care liabilities. The current arrangement discourages employers from hiring or retaining older workers. But don’t we want companies to retain older workers—to hire on the basis of ability and not age? In fact, a system in which companies shoulder their own benefits is ultimately a system that penalizes companies for offering any benefits at all. Many employers have simply decided to let their workers fend for themselves. Given what has so publicly and disastrously happened to companies like General Motors, can you blame them?

 

Or consider the continuous round of discounts and rebates that General Motors—a company that lost $8.6 billion last year—has been offering to customers. If you bought a Chevy Tahoe this summer, G.M. would give you zero-per-cent financing, or six thousand dollars cash back. Surely, if you are losing money on every car you sell, as G.M. is, cutting car prices still further in order to boost sales doesn’t make any sense. It’s like the old Borsht-belt joke about the haberdasher who lost money on every hat he made but figured he’d make up the difference on volume. The economically rational thing for G.M. to do would be to restructure, and sell fewer cars at a higher profit margin—and that’s what G.M. tried to do this summer, announcing plans to shutter plants and buy out the contracts of thirty-five thousand workers. But buyouts, which turn active workers into pensioners, only worsen the company’s dependency ratio. Last year, G.M. covered the costs of its four hundred and fifty-three thousand retirees and their dependents with the revenue from 4.5 million cars and trucks. How is G.M. better off covering the costs of four hundred and eighty-eighty thousand dependents with the revenue from, say, 4.2 million cars and trucks? This is the impossible predicament facing the company’s C.E.O., Rick Wagoner. Demographic logic requires him to sell more cars and hire more workers; financial logic requires him to sell fewer cars and hire fewer workers.

 

Under the circumstances, one of the great mysteries of contemporary American politics is why Wagoner isn’t the nation’s leading proponent of universal health care and expanded social welfare. That’s the only way out of G.M.’s dilemma. But, from Wagoner’s reticence on the issue, you’d think that it was still 1950, or that Wagoner believes he’s the Prime Minister of Ireland. “One thing I’ve learned is that corporate America has got much more class solidarity than we do—meaning union people,” the U.S.W.’s Ron Bloom says. “They really are afraid of getting thrown out of their country clubs, even though their objective ought to be maximizing value for their shareholders.”

 

David Bloom, the Harvard economist, once did a calculation in which he combined the dependency ratios of Africa and Western Europe. He found that they fit together almost perfectly; that is, Africa has plenty of young people and not a lot of older people and Western Europe has plenty of old people and not a lot of young people, and if you combine the two you have an even distribution of old and young. “It makes you think that if there is more international migration, that could smooth things out,” Bloom said.

 

Of course, you can’t take the populations of different countries and different cultures and simply merge them, no matter how much demographic sense that might make. But you can do that with companies within an economy. If the retiree obligations of Bethlehem Steel had been pooled with those of the much younger industries that supplanted steel—aluminum, say, or plastic—Bethlehem Steel might have made it. If you combined the obligations of G.M., with its four hundred and fifty-three thousand retirees, and the American manufacturing operations of Toyota, with a mere two hundred and fifty-eight retirees, Toyota could help G.M. shoulder its burden, and thirty or forty years from now—when those G.M. retirees are dead and Toyota’s now youthful workforce has turned gray—G.M. could return the favor. For that matter, if you pooled the obligations of every employer in the country, no company would go bankrupt just because it happened to employ older people, or it happened to have been around for a while, or it happened to have made the transformation from open-hearth furnaces and ingot-making to basic oxygen furnaces and continuous casting. This is what Walter Reuther and the other union heads understood more than fifty years ago: that in the free-market system it makes little sense for the burdens of insurance to be borne by one company. If the risks of providing for health care and old-age pensions are shared by all of us, then companies can succeed or fail based on what they do and not on the number of their retirees.

 

When Bethlehem Steel filed for bankruptcy, it owed about four billion dollars to its pension plan, and had another three billion dollars in unmet health-care obligations. Two years later, in 2003, the pension fund was terminated and handed over to the federal government’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The assets of the company—Sparrows Point and a handful of other steel mills in the Midwest—were sold to the New York-based investor Wilbur Ross.

 

Ross acted quickly. He set up a small trust fund to help defray Bethlehem’s unmet retiree health-care costs, cut a deal with the union to streamline work rules, put in place a new 401(k) savings plan—and then started over. The new Bethlehem Steel had a dependency ratio of 0 to 1. Within about six months, it was profitable. The main problem with the American steel business wasn’t the steel business, Ross showed. It was all the things that had nothing to do with the steel business.

 

Not long ago, Ross sat in his sparse midtown office and explained what he had learned from his rescue of Bethlehem. Ross is in his sixties, a Yale- and Harvard-educated patrician with small rectangular glasses and impeccable manners. Outside his office, by the elevator, was a large sculpture of a bull, papered over from head to hoof with stock tables.

 

“When we showed up to the Bethlehem board to approve the deal, they had an army of people there,” Ross said. “The whole board was there, the whole senior management was there, people from Credit Suisse and Greenhill were there. They must have had about fifty or sixty people there for a deal that was already done. So my partner and I—just the two of us—show up, and they say, ‘Well, we should wait for the rest of your team.’ And we said, ‘There is no rest of the team, there is just the two of us.’ It said the whole thing right there.”

 

Ross isn’t a fan of old-style pensions, because they make it impossible to run a company efficiently. “When a company gets in trouble and restructures,” he said, those underfunded pension funds “will eat it alive.” And how much sense does employer-provided health insurance make? Bethlehem made promises to its employees, years ago, to give them medical insurance in exchange for their labor, and when the company ran into trouble those promises simply evaporated. “Every country against which we compete has universal health care,” he said. “That means we probably face a fifteen-per-cent cost disadvantage versus foreigners for no other reason than historical accident. . . . The randomness of our system is just not going to work.”

 

This is what Walter Reuther believed. He went along with Wilson’s scheme in 1950 because he thought that agreeing with Wilson was the surest way of getting Wilson and the other captains of industry to agree with him. “Reuther and his brain trust had a theory of capitalism,” Nelson Lichtenstein, the Reuther biographer, says. “It was: If we force G.M. to pay extra, we can create an incentive for G.M. to join our side.” Reuther believed, in other words, that when American corporations reached the point where they couldn’t make their business more efficient without making it less profitable, when their dependency ratios soared to unimaginable heights, when they got tens of billions behind in their health-care obligations, when the cost of carrying thou-sands of retirees forced them to stare bankruptcy in the face, they would come around to the idea that the markets work best when the burdens of benefits are broadly shared. It has taken half a century, but the world may finally be catching up with Walter Reuther.

Bullet Points for Legislators

  • Single Payer saves money.  For the past 20 years, states have commissioned studies on different types of health care systems.   In EVERY case, single payer was shown to be the only way to cover everyone and the only system that saved money and controlled costs.

  • Publicly financed does not mean government run health care.  YOU have publicly finance health coverage, but the government does not make decisions regarding your health care.

  • Cost conscious patients often don't get the care they need.   Most decisions are made by the doctor in concert with the patient, but the patient relies on the doctor's knowledge to make a decision.  Expensive tests and treatments cannot be ordered by the patient, only the doctor.

  • Lifestyle choices are not what is fueling high costs in health care.   The United States ranks low in general health indicators, but high in good health habits.  We smoke less, drink less and consume less animal fat that many other countries with better health indicators and much lower health care costs.

  • Businesses can accurately determine their health care costs and are not subject to unanticipated large premium increases.

  • It will reduce labor costs due to a more efficient way of financing health care, eliminating much wasteful administration.

  • Workers' Compensation costs will be reduced, likely by half, due to the fact that everyone has health coverage and there is no need for the medical portion.

  • It reduces the need for part time employees and provides easier recruiting.  There are no pre-existing conditions or Cobra issues.

  • Eliminates the oversight of health benefits and bargaining health coverage with employees.

  • It creates healthier personnel and more stable employees, reduces absenteeism and eliminates employer health coverage complaints.

  • It reduces employee health related debt and personal bankruptcies.

  • It frees up family income that can be spent on other goods and services, thus stimulating the economy.

Tips for Writing Letters to Editor

Follow guidelines for your local paper (word count, submission instructions, etc.)

Frame your letter in relation to a recent news item Use state specific data whenever possible (let us know if you need help finding some!)

Address counter arguments

Be aware of your audience and emphasize how Medicare for All is good for ALL residents of the state

Criticize other positions, not people Include your credentials (especially if you work in the healthcare field)

Avoid jargon and abbreviations

Don’t overload on statistics and minor details

Cover only one or two points in a single letter

Avoid rambling and vagueness

DONATE HERE

Donations to SPAN Ohio help cover operating and lobbying expenses and ARE NOT tax deductible.

Donations to HCFAO go to our education fund and ARE tax deductible.

 

UPCOMING EVENTS

  • Cleveland SPAN presents Fix It: ... Mon. 20 Feb, 2017 (7:00 pm - 9:00 pm) Lakewood Public Library, 15425 Detroit Ave, Lakewood, OH   Fix It: Healthcare at the Tipping Point ...a powerf...
  • SPAN Region 4 Monthly Meeting Wed. 22 Feb, 2017 (7:00 pm - 8:30 pm) Region 4 (SW  Ohio) will hold its monthly meeting on Wed. 2/22/17 at 7PM at 1st Unitarian  Church, 536 Linton Av...
  • The Health Care Movie - Free Scr... Tue. 28 Feb, 2017 (7:30 pm - 9:30 pm) Documentary film 'The Health Care Movie' will be shown on Tues., Feb. 28th at 7:30PM followed by discussion. Location: Ham...
  • Cleveland SPAN presents Fix It: ... Mon. 13 Mar, 2017 (7:00 pm - 9:00 pm) Cleveland Heights Public Library, 2345 Lee Road, Cleveland Heights, OH (coffee at 6:30 PM)   Fix It: Healthcar...
  • Cleveland SPAN Planning Meeting Mon. 27 Mar, 2017 6:00 pm Agenda: Reports  and updates.  Discussion of current situation for health care advocates; plans for upcoming act...
  • SPAN Annual State Conference Sat. 29 Apr, 2017 (10:00 am - 4:00 pm) Quest Business & Conference Center, 8405 Pulsar Place, Columbus, OH 43240
Add New Event Show Full Calendar